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Abstract
The notion of conditional possibility derived from marginal possibility measures has received dif-
ferent treatments. As shown by Bouchon-Meunier et al., conditional possibility can be introduced as a
primitive notion generalizing simple possibility measures. In this paper, following an approach
already adopted by the author w.r.t. conditional probability, we build up the fuzzy modal logic
FCP, relying on Rational Pavelka Logic RPL, so as to reason about coherent conditional possibilities
and necessities. First, we apply a modal operator  over conditional events ujv to obtain modal for-
mulas of the type (ujv) whose reading is ‘‘ujv is possible’’. Then, we deﬁne the truth-value of the
modal formulas as corresponding to a conditional possibility measure. The logic FCP is shown to
be strongly complete for ﬁnite theories w.r.t. to the class of the introduced conditional possibility
Kripke structures. Then, we show that any rational assessment of conditional possibilities is coherent
iﬀ a suitably deﬁned theory over FCP is consistent. We also prove compactness for rational coherent
assessments of conditional possibilities. We derive the notion of generalized conditional necessity
from the notion of generalized conditional possibility, and we show and discuss how to represent
those concepts introducing some logics generalizing FCP. Finally we show how to frame qualitative
comparative relations in this logical framework.
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1. Possibility theory and conditioning
Possibility theory was ﬁrst introduced by Zadeh in [46] so as to deal with that kind of
uncertainty induced by vague information based on fuzzy sets. Such a theory provides
both a qualitative and quantitative treatment of partial belief [16,18] relying on a normal-
ized function called possibility distribution px, assigning to each possible situation a value
from a totally ordered scale. An information is then evaluated w.r.t. px by means of the
dual pair of possibility and necessity measures which capture the degrees of compatibility
and certainty of such information, respectively.
Given a frame of discernment U of possible situations and a variable x ranging over U
(denoting an unknown value taken by one or several attributes used to describe states of
aﬀairs), a possibility distribution px is a mapping px : U! L, where L is a bounded totally
ordered scale, often exempliﬁed by the real unit interval [0, 1]. A possibility distribution
aims at describing a state of knowledge by distinguishing what is plausible from what is less
plausible, what is surprising from what is expected. px behaves by ﬂexibly restricting the val-
ues of x so that: px(u) = 0 means that u = x is impossible, px(u) = 1 means that u = x is
totally possible. Notice that px is normalized, i.e. there exists some u such that px(u) = 1.
Possibility distributions can represent situations of incomplete information, situations in
which we can only order the possible values of x according to their level of plausibility or
possibility. In this framework extreme forms of partial knowledge can be captured, namely:
• Complete knowledge: px(u0) = 1 for some u0 and px(u) = 0, "u5 u0.
• Complete ignorance: px(u) = 1, "u.
Given two distribution functions px and p0x, whenever px < p
0
x, px is said to be more spe-
ciﬁc than p0x. The principle of minimal speciﬁcity [18] states that given a set of constraints
that delimits a family of possibility distributions that act as candidate representations of a
state of knowledge, the best representative among them is the least speciﬁc possibility
distribution.
In the case of incomplete information we can compute to what extent the information
described by px is consistent with other information. The possibility measure associated to
an event u then is deﬁned from px as follows:
PðuÞ ¼ sup
u2u
pxðuÞ:
P(Æ) estimates the consistency of the statement ‘‘x is u’’ with what we know about the pos-
sible values of x.P(u) expresses to what extent the truth of a statement is not incompatible
with the available evidence. The basic axioms of possibility measures are:
• P(;) = 0;
• P(U) = 1;
• P(¨i2Iui) = supi2IP(ui).
The necessity measure associated to u can be deﬁned as follows:
NðuÞ ¼ 1Pð:uÞ ¼ inf
u2u
1 pxðuÞ:
N(u) estimates the certainty of the occurrence of u. It expresses to what extent the avail-
able evidence entails the truth of this event. Measures of possibility P and necessity N can
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be also introduced independently from a possibility distribution. Indeed, they are fuzzy
measures which are weakly compositional w.r.t. union and intersection, respectively:
 Pðu _ vÞ ¼ maxfPðuÞ;PðvÞg  Nðu ^ vÞ ¼ minfNðuÞ;NðvÞg:
The notion of conditioning for possibility measures has received diﬀerent treatments. The
ﬁrst were those proposed by Zadeh [46], Hisdal [35] and Nguyen [42]. In general, the con-
ditional possibility P(ujv) can be viewed as the solution to the equation
Pðu ^ vÞ ¼Tðx;PðvÞÞ;
whereT is a t-norm,1 and P(ujv) is deﬁned as the greatest solution.2 This would then be
equivalent to the following equation [13]:
PðujvÞ ¼ IðPðvÞ;Pðu ^ vÞÞ;
where I is the residuum of the t-norm.
A classical treatment [17] consists in taking the minimum t-norm, to obtain a qualitative
deﬁnition. This, however, yields some technical problems in the inﬁnite case, given that
Go¨del implication Im is not continuous. This can be avoided by deﬁning a probability-like
conditioning by means of the product t-norm. Indeed, as shown in [14], not any t-norm
can be used if we want the mapping P(Æjv) to be a possibility measure. If we rely on an
arbitrary universe, T must be a strict t-norm, i.e. continuous, Archimedean and without
zero-divisors. If the universe is ﬁnite, T needs not be Archimedean, and then we can
recover the minimum t-norm.
In [34,1–3], a diﬀerent treatment of possibilistic conditioning based on conditional events
is presented. Indeed, in order to avoid any problem with conditioning (like conditioning
with null-possibility), a primitive conditional possibility measure can be deﬁned directly
over the Cartesian product EH, where E is a Boolean algebra, andH0  E is an addi-
tive set3 (i.e. closed under ﬁnite union).
Deﬁnition 1.1 [2]. A real functionP deﬁned on C ¼ EH, where E is a Boolean algebra,
H0 an additive set, with H0  E and H0 ¼H n f;g, is a conditional possibility if the
following conditions hold:
(i) P(ujv) = P(u ^ vjv), for every u 2 E and v 2H.
(ii) P(Æjv) is a possibility measure, for any given v 2H.
(iii) P(u ^ wjv) = min{P(ujv), P(wju ^ v)}, for every w 2 E and u; v 2H, u ^ v5 ;.
1 T-norms are binary, commutative, associative and monotone functions deﬁned over [0,1] with 1 as identity
element. In other words each t-normT makes [0,1] into a commutative monoid. Moreover, recall that a t-norm
admits a residual implication I if and only if it is left-continuous. This means that a left-continuous t-norm
makes [0,1] into a commutative integral residuated lattice-ordered monoid. See [38] for all details.
2 That is driven by the principle of minimum speciﬁcity.
3 Notice that the approach carried out by Halpern in [34] and the one by Bouchon-Meunier, Coletti and
Marsala [1–3] oﬀer a deﬁnition of conditional possibility which is quite similar, but is supported by diﬀerent
motivations. A relevant technical diﬀerence consists in the fact that Halpern requires the Cartesian product to be
a Popper algebra, i.e. a structure EH, where E is a Boolean algebra, andH  E is closed under supersets (see
[34]). The deﬁnition of conditional possibility we provide here corresponds to the one given in [2].
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The dual notion of conditional necessity N(ÆjÆ) is introduced in [2] by means of the invol-
utive standard negation4 ns(x) = 1  x.
Deﬁnition 1.2 [2]. A real functionN deﬁned on C ¼ EH, where E is a Boolean algebra,
H0 an additive set, with H0  E and H0 ¼H n f;g, is a conditional necessity if the
following conditions hold:
(i) N(ujv) = N(u ^ vjv), for every u 2 E and v 2H.
(ii) N(Æjv) is a necessity measure, for any given v 2H.
(iii) Nðu _ wjvÞ ¼ maxfNðujvÞ;Nðwj:u ^ vÞg, for every w, u 2 E and :u, v 2H,
:u ^ v 6¼ ;.
Being possibilistic logic a relevant exception [15], there are not many logical treatments
of possibility theory. In this paper, we exploit an idea already carried out in [27–
29,31,32,40]. As shown w.r.t. conditional probabilities in [40,29], we take as the truth-
value of the modal proposition ‘‘ujv is possible’’ the corresponding measure of conditional
possibility. Then we obtain modal propositions of the form ðujvÞ} which can be combined
by means of the connectives of the fuzzy logic RPL, which allow to represent the charac-
teristic operations of conditional possibility. We obtain the logic FCP, which is shown to
be strongly complete for ﬁnite theories and which does capture the notion of coherent
assessment of conditional possibilities. We will also show how to extend such a logical
treatment in order to deal with generalized conditional possibilities and necessity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some background
notions concerning fuzzy logics, while in the third we brieﬂy discuss the adequacy of sev-
eral fuzzy logics for representing the properties of possibilistic conditioning. In Section 4
we introduce both the syntax and the semantics of the logic FCP, along with the com-
pleteness result. In Section 5 we show that the basic properties of conditional possibility
and necessity are carved in FCP. In the next section we prove that the coherence (in
the sense of [9]) of a rational assessment of conditional possibility is tantamount to the
consistency of a suitably deﬁned theory in FCP, and moreover that such assessments
are compact. In Section 7, we introduce the notion of generalized conditional possibility
and necessity and modify the previous logic so as to represent such more general measures.
We discuss which logics might be the most appropriate to capture those notions. In
Section 8 we show how qualitative comparative possibilistic relations can be recovered
in our logical framework. We end with some ﬁnal remarks.
2. Background notions on fuzzy logics
In this section we provide a very brief overview of some fuzzy logics. For all details con-
sult [31] and the papers appearing in the references below.
The Basic fuzzy Logic BL was introduced by Ha´jek in [31] to represent continuous
t-norms and their residua. BL is built up from the two primitive connectives & and !
and the truth constant 0. Further connectives are deﬁned as follows:
4 Recall that an involutive negation function (also called strong negation) n : [0,1]! [0,1] is a continuous,
strictly decreasing, order-reversing mapping such that n(n(x)) = x for all x 2 [0,1] (see [45]).
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:u is u! 0;
u ^ w is u&ðu! wÞ;
u _ w is ððu! wÞ ! wÞ ^ ððw! uÞ ! uÞ;
u  w is ðu! wÞ&ðw! uÞ:
The following formulas are the axioms of BL:
(A1) (u! w)! ((w! v)! (u! v)).
(A2) (u&w)! w.
(A3) (u&w)! (w&u).
(A4) (u&(u! w)! (w&(w! u)).
(A5a) (u! (w! v))! ((u&w)! v).
(A5b) ((u&w)! v)! (u! (w! v)).
(A6) ((u! w)! v)! (((w! u)! v)! v).
(A7) 0! u.
The deduction rule of BL is modus ponens.
For every theory C (i.e. set of formulas) and for every formula u, we say that u can be
derived from C in BL (C ‘BL u) iﬀ there is a ﬁnite sequence w1, . . . ,wn of formulas such that
wn = u and for i = 1, . . . ,n, either wi is an axiom of BL, or wi 2 C, or wi can be derived by
modus ponens from a ﬁnite number of formulas wj and j < i.
5 A theory C is said to be con-
sistent if C 0 0.
An evaluation e is a mapping from the set of propositional variables into the real unit
interval. Under the evaluation e, the conjunction & is interpreted by a continuous t-norm
T, and the implication ! by its related residuum I, while _ and ^ correspond to max-
imum and minimum, respectively. We say that an evaluation e is a model of a formula u if
and only if e(u) = 1. A formula u is a 1-tautology if and only if e(u) = 1 for all evaluations
e. As usual, if C is a theory, C  u means that every model of all formulas c 2 C also is a
model of u.
The algebraic semantics for the BL logic is given by BL-algebras, i.e. commutative
bounded integral residuated lattices which satisfy the divisibility and the prelinearity
conditions. In [30,5] BL was shown to be complete w.r.t. to standard BL-algebras,
i.e. BL-algebras over the real unit interval. Therefore, BL-theorems are exactly the formu-
las which are 1-tautologies for each continuous t-norm T and its corresponding residual
implication I.
BL has three natural extensions corresponding to Łukasiewicz logic Ł, obtained by
adding to BL the axiom
::u! u;
Go¨del logic G, obtained by adding to BL the axiom
u! ðu&uÞ;
5 The notions of proof and evaluation given here for BL can be obviously extended to all other logics of the
family of t-norm-based logics we refer to.
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Product logic P, obtained by adding to BL the axioms
::v! ðððu&vÞ ! ðw&vÞÞ ! ðu! wÞÞ;
u ^ :u! 0:
Such logics correspond to the main three continuous t-norms over the real unit inter-
val, namely the Łukasiewicz t-norm Tlðx; yÞ ¼ maxðxþ y  1; 0Þ; the Go¨del t-norm
Tmðx; yÞ ¼ minðx; yÞ; and the Product t-norm Tpðx; yÞ ¼ x  y. Their respective residua
are given by
Ilðx; yÞ ¼ minð1 xþ y; 1Þ;
Imðx; yÞ ¼
1; if x 6 y;
y; otherwise;

Ipðx; yÞ ¼
1; if x 6 y;
y
x ; otherwise:
(
All the above logics enjoy ﬁnite strong standard completeness.6
Łukasiewicz logic can be extended so as to deal with partial degrees of truth by intro-
ducing rational truth constants r 2 ½0; 1	 in the Ł-language. Any r, then, is a formula
whose evaluation e clearly is eðrÞ ¼ r. The logic so obtained is called Rational Pavelka
Logic (RPL) [43,31], and its axioms are those of Łukasiewicz logic, plus the following
bookkeeping axioms:
:r  1 r;
r ! s  minð1; 1 r þ sÞ:
Given a theory C and a formula u over RPL, we can deﬁne
• the truth-degree of u over C, kukC = inf{e(u)je is a model of C};
• the provability degree of u over C, jujC ¼ supfrjC ‘ r ! ug.
In [31], RPL is shown to be strongly complete w.r.t. ﬁnite theories, moreover it enjoys a
special type of completeness called Pavelka-style completeness, i.e.:
kukC ¼ jujC;
for each theory C and each formula u.
Also Go¨del logic and Product logic have been extended by introducing rational truth-
constants [31,22,44]. However, Pavelka-style completeness is quite complicated for such
cases since Go¨del and Product implications are discontinuous functions. RP enjoys
Pavelka-style completeness [20], but it includes the inﬁnitary inference rule
from u! r; for each r > 0; derive u! 0:
Recently (see [22,44]), RG has been shown to be standard complete, as well as the logic
P(C) (where C is a countable subset of [0,1] being a Product subalgebra) [44]. Neither
RG nor P(C) enjoys ﬁnite strong standard completeness.
6 Recall that a fuzzy logic enjoys strong standard completeness whenever, given any countable theory C and any
formula u, we have that C  u iﬀ C ‘ u. A logic enjoys ﬁnite strong standard completeness where the above
equivalence holds for ﬁnite theories only. Finally, a logic is standard complete whenever u iﬀ ‘u.
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The above logics can be expanded by introducing an involutive negation7 in their lan-
guage so enhancing their expressive power. This has been studied for Go¨del and Product
logics (see [20]), in which a connective 
 has been introduced along with the axioms
(where Du is : 
 u)
(
1) 
 
 u  u,
(
2) :u!
 u,
(
3) D(u! w)! D(
w!
 u),
(D1) Du _ :Du,
(D2) D(u _ w)! (Du _ Dw),
(D5) D(u! w)! (Du! Dw),
plus the Necessitation rule: from u derive Du. The logics so deﬁned, G
 and P
, have
been shown to be standard complete and semi-standard complete,8 respectively (see [20]).
Rational expansions of both G
 and P
 by means of the respective bookkeeping axi-
oms, called RG
 and RP
 have been introduced in [20]. Such logics were shown to be
strong standard complete for ﬁnite theories, but they both need an inﬁnitary inference
rule.
In [36] the authors introduced the logics PŁ and PŁ 0 which extend Łukasiewicz logic by
means of the product conjunction. The language of those logics is built up from a count-
able set of propositional variables, three binary connectives & (Łukasiewicz conjunction),
!l (Łukasiewicz implication),  (Product conjunction), and the truth constant 0. Axioms
of PŁ are those of Łukasiewicz logic, plus the following additional axioms:
(P1) u  (w  v)  (u  w)  (u  v),
(P2) u  (v  w)  (u  w)  v,
(P3) u! u 1,
(P4) u  w! u,
(P5) u  w! w  u.
PŁ 0 extends PŁ by the deduction rule (ZD):
• if :ðu uÞ, then :u.
While PŁ 0 enjoys ﬁnite strong standard completeness, PŁ does not. In [36], the authors
also studied extensions of such logics by means of Baaz’s D, yielding the logics PŁD and
PŁ0D, and extensions obtained by adding rational truth-constants plus the related
bookkeeping axioms, obtaining the logics RPPŁ, RPPŁ 0, RPPŁD and RPPŁ
0
D (see [36]
for all details). Pavelka-style completeness was proved for all rational extensions, while
7 Obviously Łukasiewicz logic does not need to be expanded since its negation, derived from the residual
implication, corresponds to the standard involutive negation.
8 For such logics standard completeness means completeness w.r.t. standard algebras, i.e. algebras whose lattice
reduct is [0,1] and such that the truth-function for 
 is the standard involutive negation ns(x) = 1  x. Semi-
standard completeness means completeness w.r.t. semi-standard algebras, i.e. algebras whose lattice reduct is [0,1]
and such that the truth-function for 
 is any strong negation.
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strong standard completeness was proved for RPPŁD and RPPŁ
0
D, which are also shown to
be equivalent.
In [21] the authors introduced the logics ŁP and ŁP 1
2
which extend all the above logics.
The language of the ŁP logic is built up from a countable set of propositional variables,
three binary connectives !l (Łukasiewicz implication),  (Product conjunction) and !p
(Product implication), and the truth constant 0. The truth constant 1 is deﬁned as u!l u.
In this way we have eð1Þ ¼ 1 for any truth-evaluation e. Moreover, many other connec-
tives can be deﬁned from those introduced above:
:u is u!l0; :pu is u!p0;
u ^ w is u&ðu!lwÞ; u _ w is :ð:u ^ :wÞ;
u w is :u!lw; u&w is :ð:u :wÞ;
u w is u&:w; u  w is ðu!lwÞ&ðw!luÞ;
Du is :p:u; ru is :p:pu;
with the following interpretations:
eð:uÞ ¼ 1 eðuÞ; eð:puÞ ¼
1; if eðuÞ ¼ 0;
0; otherwise;

eðu ^ wÞ ¼ minðeðuÞ; eðwÞÞ; eðu _ wÞ ¼ maxðeðuÞ; eðwÞÞ;
eðu wÞ ¼ minð1; eðuÞ þ eðwÞÞ; eðu&wÞ ¼ maxð0; eðuÞ þ eðwÞ  1Þ;
eðu wÞ ¼ maxð0; eðuÞ  eðwÞÞ; eðu  wÞ ¼ 1 jeðuÞ  eðwÞj;
eðDuÞ ¼ 1; if eðuÞ ¼ 1;
0; otherwise:

eðruÞ ¼ 1; if eðuÞ > 0;
0; otherwise:

The logic ŁP is deﬁned Hilbert-style as the logical system whose axioms and rules are the
following:9
(i) Axioms of Łukasiewicz Logic.
(ii) Axioms of Product Logic.
(iii) The following additional axioms relating Łukasiewicz and Product logic connectives,
plus axiom (P1):
(:) :pu!l:u.
(D) D(u!l w)  D(u!p w).
(iv) Deduction rules of ŁP are modus ponens for !l (modus ponens for !p is deriv-
able), and necessitation for D: from u derive Du.
The logic ŁP 1
2
is the logic obtained from ŁP by expanding the language with a prop-
ositional variable 1
2
and adding the axiom:
ŁP
1
2
 
1
2
 :1
2
:
Finite strong standard completeness of both logics has been proved in [21].
9 See [21,6] for details.
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As it is also shown in [21], for each rational r 2 [0,1] a formula r is deﬁnable in ŁP 1
2
from
the truth constant 1
2
and the connectives, so that eðrÞ ¼ r for each evaluation e. Therefore, in
the ŁP 1
2
-language we have a truth constant for each rational in [0,1], as follows:
•
1
2n
is given by
1
2
 . . . 1
2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
n
;
•
m
2
is given by
1
2
 . . . 1
2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
m
;
•
1
n
is given by
n
2n
!p 1
2n
;
•
m
n
is given by
1
m
!p1n.
Due to ŁP 1
2
-completeness, the following book-keeping axioms for rational truth con-
stants are provable:
(RŁP1) :r  1 r,
(RŁP2) r!ls  minð1; 1 r þ sÞ,
(RŁP3) r  s  r  s,
(RŁP4) r!ps  r)ps,
where r)p s = 1 if r 6 s, r)p s ¼ sr otherwise.
BL is not the most general fuzzy logic. Indeed, in [19], Esteva and Godo introduced the
Monoidal T-norm based Logic MTL in order to capture the logic of left-continuous t-
norms and their residua. This was motivated by the fact that, in order to guarantee the
existence of the residuum, left-continuity is a suﬃcient condition. The axioms of MTL
are those of BL, without (A4), plus the following ones:
(A8) (u ^ w)! w,
(A9) (u ^ w)! (w ^ u),
(A10) u&(u! w)! (u ^ w).
Notice that in MTL full divisibility no longer holds, then the above axioms are needed
in order to specify the behavior of ^. MTL was shown in [37], by Jenei and Montagna, to
be strongly standard complete w.r.t. MTL-algebras over the real unit interval, i.e. algebras
deﬁned by left-continuous t-norms and their residua.
Such a logic has been recently extended in [25,26] by means of an arbitrary involutive
negation obtaining the logic MTL
. The axioms and inference rules of MTL
 are those of
MTL plus (
1), (
3), (D1), (D2), (D5), the Necessitation rule, and the following ones:
(D3) Du! u,
(D4) Du! DDu.
This allows to represent not only left-continuous t-norms but also all their dual t-con-
orms by means of involutive negations, since they form De Morgan Triples (see [38]).
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3. Which fuzzy logics for possibilistic conditioning?
In this section we brieﬂy analyze the adequacy of diﬀerent fuzzy logics for representing
both primitive and derived possibilistic conditioning.10 In order to do so, we have to point
out which features we need to represent. The below discussion is summarized in Table 1.
We investigate ﬁrst the case of simple possibility measures and derived conditioning.
Clearly possibility measures are characterized by their axioms and the operations involved
in such axioms. As mentioned above, they are non-additive fuzzy measures satisfying the
following properties (over [0,1]):
• P(?) = 0;
• P(>) = 1;
• if u! w, then P(u) 6 P(w);
• P(u _ w) = max(P(u),P(w)).
It is easy to see that all we have to represent is an order relation and the maximum oper-
ation. This can be done in any fuzzy logic by means of the implication operator and the
connective _. Indeed, implication is interpreted as the residuum of the t-norm and it
expresses a comparative notion of truth. Moreover, maximum disjunction is available in
any member of the family of fuzzy logics.
Recall now that, if the universe is ﬁnite, conditioning (see Section 1) can be deﬁned by
means of the residuum of a continuous t-norm without zero-divisors. If the universe is inﬁ-
nite such a t-norm must be also Archimedean. Hence, as shown above, two natural deﬁ-
nitions for conditional possibility are the following:
• PmðujvÞ ¼ ImðPðvÞ;Pðu ^ vÞÞ ¼ 1; if PðvÞ 6 Pðu ^ vÞ;Pðu ^ vÞ; otherwise;

• PpðujvÞ ¼ IpðPðvÞ;Pðu ^ vÞÞ ¼
1; if PðvÞ 6 Pðu ^ vÞ;
Pðu^vÞ
PðvÞ ; otherwise:

Clearly, in order to model such operators in a fuzzy logic framework we need Go¨del
implication and Product implication, respectively. Hence, such types of derived condition-
ing can be framed in Go¨del logic, the former, and in Product logic, the latter.
What if we want to represent conditional possibility in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.1? It is
easy to see that in such a case the requirements are almost the same as those for simple
possibility measures. In addition we just have to represent the minimum operation, but
this can be done in any fuzzy logic.
It would be interesting to be able to represent also necessity measures and conditional
necessity. Recall that they are derived from possibility measures and conditional possibil-
ity, respectively, by means of the standard involutive negation ns(x) = 1  x, so that
10 Notice that we take into account only logics stronger than BL. Even if some properties we need are available
also in logics based on left-continuous t-norms, there are others which require further investigation. For instance,
there is not yet a study of rational extensions for all the logics between MTL and BL, neither is there any
compactness result. Stronger logics as Łukasiewicz, Go¨del, Product and their extensions are much better known.
Moreover, notice that we do not discuss in this section generalized conditional possibility, which will be treated in
Section 7.
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• NðuÞ ¼ 1Pð:uÞ, and
• NðujvÞ ¼ 1Pð:ujvÞ.
As shown in Table 1, Ł, G
, P
, PŁ and PŁ 0 are all adequate for our purposes, but, as
mentioned in the previous section, P
 is not complete w.r.t. standard algebras having the
standard involutive negation, and PŁ is not even standard complete.
The foregoing solutions would be, however, just qualitative ones. We would be able to
represent comparative relations, but not numerical assessments. For instance, we might
need to express that the possibility of u is 0.6. This can be done in those fuzzy logics which
have in their language rational truth-constants, as RPL, RG, RG
, RP, P(C), RP
,
RPPŁD and ŁP 12. Thus RG, RG
 and RPPŁD would be appropriate for conditioning with
Go¨del implication plus rational assessments, so would RP, P(C), RP
 for conditioning
with Product implication plus rational assessments. RPL and RPPŁD would work for sim-
ple possibility and necessity measures, and conditional possibility and necessity, plus ratio-
nals, while ŁP 1
2
is appropriate for all the above cases. However, recall that neither RG,
nor RP, nor P(C) is strongly standard complete w.r.t. ﬁnite theories.
To conclude, we could ask what the best solution is if we want to represent primitive
conditional possibility in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.1, along with conditional necessity
and rational assessments. The possible choices are RPL, RG
, RP
, RPPŁD and ŁP 12.
In [39], we relied on ŁP 1
2
, but it is unnecessarily strong for our purposes. Moreover, nei-
ther RG
 nor RP
 are compact logics.
11 This would then make impossible to obtain com-
pactness results for rational assessments as shown in Section 6. RPPŁD seems to be an
adequate choice, but it is too strong, and we do not need multiplication. Thus, RPL might
represent the best choice.
11 Compactness for RG
 and RP
 has not been explicitly studied. However, as shown in [8], neither G
 nor P

are compact (notice that G
 with a ﬁnite set of atomic symbol is compact). Thus, clearly compactness does not
hold for RG
 and RP
.
Table 1
Framing possibilistic conditioning
P(Æ) N(Æ) Q \ ½0; 1	 Pm(ÆjÆ) Pp(ÆjÆ) P(ÆjÆ) N(ÆjÆ)
Ł Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
RPL Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
G Yes No No Yes No Yes No
RG Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
G
 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
RG
 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
P Yes No No No Yes Yes No
RP/P(C) Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
P
 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RP
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PŁ Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
PŁ 0 Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
RPPŁD Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
ŁP Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ŁP 12 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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4. A logic of conditional possibility
In this section we introduce the modal fuzzy logic FCP in order to reason about condi-
tional possibility in the sense of the above deﬁnition. FCP is built up over RPL extending
its language by including modal formulas which represent the possibility of conditional
events. We deﬁne the language in two steps. First, we take into account classical Boolean
formulas u,w, etc., deﬁned in the usual way from the classical connectives ð^;:Þ and from a
countable set V of propositional variables p,q, . . ., etc. The set of Boolean formulas is
denoted by L. Moreover given any set D L, we denote by Con(D) the set of sentences
which logically follow fromD in classical logic. Moreover, SatðLÞ and TautðLÞ will denote
the set of classically satisﬁable formulas and the set of classical tautologies, respectively.
Elementary modal sentences are formulas of the form (ujv), where is a unary operator
taking as arguments conditional events ujv, such that u and v are Boolean sentences, and
v 2 SatðLÞ. Compound modal formulas are built by means of the RPL-connectives (!,
&, ^, _, . . .) and the truth constants r, for each rational r 2 [0,1]. We also introduce a
derived modal operatorN such that ðujvÞN  :ð:ujvÞ}. Nested modalities are not allowed.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The axioms of the logic FCP are the following:
(i) The set TautðLÞ of classical Boolean tautologies.
(ii) Axioms of RPL for modal formulas.
(iii) Possibilistic modal axioms:
(CP1) ðujvÞ} ! ðu ^ vjvÞ}
(CP2) ðu _ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} _ ðwjvÞ}
(CP3) ðu ^ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} ^ ðwju ^ vÞ}
(CP4) :ð? jvÞ}
Deduction rules of FCP are those of RPL (i.e. modus ponens), plus:
(iv) modalization: from u derive ðujvÞ},
(v) substitution of equivalents for the conditioning event: from vM v 0, derive ðujvÞ} 
ðujv0Þ},
(vi) monotonicity: from u! w derive ðujvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ}.
The language we have deﬁned clearly is a hybrid language. Indeed, any theory (set of
formulas) we will deal with will be of the form C = D [ T, where D contains only non-
modal formulas and T contains only modal formulas. Notice that there is no direct inter-
action between non-modal and modal formulas, with the exception of the application of
the above rules of inference. However the role of modalization, substitution of equivalents
and monotonicity only consists in generating new modal formulas which can then take
part in the deduction. On the other hand, in proofs from C, we want to avoid inconsisten-
cies. In fact, the application of the above inference rules can yield modal formulas with
conditioning events contradictory with D. As an example, if D ¼ f:pg, where p is a prop-
ositional variable, then from D one could derive ð:pjpÞ} by applying the modalization
rule, which is in clear contradiction with ðpjpÞ} (see next section). Therefore, we are led
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to deﬁne in FCP the notion of proof from a theory, written ‘FCP, in a non-standard way,
at least when the theory contains non-modal formulas.
Deﬁnition 4.2. The proof relation ‘FCP between sets of formulas and formulas is deﬁned
by
(1) D [ T ‘FCP u if u 2 Con(D);
(2) T ‘FCP U if U follows from T in the usual way from the above axioms and rules;
(3) D [ T ‘FCP U if T [ D} ‘FCP U;
where D} ¼ fðujvÞ} : u 2 ConðDÞ; :v 62 ConðDÞ and v appears as conditioning in
subformulas of Ug.
Notice that the general lateral condition for all modal formulas that v 2 SatðLÞ, as well
as the conditions u 2 Con(D) and :v 62 ConðDÞ for the consequence relation, are decid-
able, so the notion of proof is well-deﬁned.
We now deﬁne the semantics for FCP by introducing conditional possibility Kripke
structures.
Deﬁnition 4.3. A conditional possibility Kripke model is a structure K ¼ hW ;U; e;Pi,
where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds.
• U is a Boolean algebra of subsets of W.
• e : V ·W! {0,1} is a Boolean evaluation of the propositional variables, that is,
e(p,w) 2 {0,1} for each propositional variable p 2 V and each world w 2W. Any given
truth-evaluation e(Æ,w) is extended to Boolean propositions as usual. For a Boolean
formula u, we will denote by [u]W the set of worlds in which u is true, i.e.
[u]W = {w 2 Wje(u,w) = 1}.
• P : UU0 ! ½0; 1	 is a conditional possibility over UU0, where U0 ¼ U n f;g, and
such that ([u]W,[v]W) is P-measurable for any non-modal u and v (with [v]W5 ;).12
• e(Æ,w) is extended to elementary modal formulas by deﬁning
eððujvÞ};wÞ ¼ Pð½u	W j½v	W Þ;
and to arbitrary modal formulas according to RPL-semantics, that is
eððujvÞN ;wÞ ¼ 1Pð½:u	W j½v	W Þ;
eðr;wÞ ¼ r;
eðU! W;wÞ ¼ minð1 eðU;wÞ þ eðW;wÞ; 1Þ:
We call a Kripke structure K ¼ hW ;U; e;Pi safe for a formula U if e(U,w) is deﬁned for
every world w. Trivially, any Kripke structure is safe for all non-modal formulas. Notice
that if K is a safe model for a modal formula U, then the truth-evaluation e(U,w) depends
12 Notice that in our deﬁnition the factors of the Cartesian product are the same Boolean algebra. This is clearly
a special case of what stated in Deﬁnition 1.1.
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only on the conditional possibility measure P and not on the particular world w. In this
case, we will also write eK(U) to denote e(U,w) for any w 2W.
If K is safe for U, then we say that K is a model for U, written K  U, if eK(U) = 1. If T is
a set of formulas, we say that K is a model of T if K is safe for all formulas in T and K  U
for all U 2 T.
Remark 4.4. K ¼ hW ;U; e;Pi is safe for (ujv) iff [v]W5 ; iff K 2 :v.
K ¼ hW ;U; e;i is safe for a modal formula U iff K is so for every elementary modal
subformula of U.
The notion of logical entailment relative to a class of structuresK, written K, is then
deﬁned as follows:
TKU iff K  U for each K 2K model of T which is safe for U:
If K denotes the whole class of conditional possibility Kripke structures we shall write
T FCP U. When KU holds we will say that U is valid in K, i.e. when U gets value 1
in all structures K 2K safe for U.
Remark 4.5. KU does not mean eK(U) = 1 in each structure K 2K, but only in those
structures which are safe for U.
Lemma 4.6. Axioms CP1–CP4 are valid in the class of conditional possibility Kripke struc-
tures. Moreover the modalization rule, the substitution of equivalents rule and the monotonic-
ity rule preserve validity in a model.
Proof. To prove that for any model K, eK(CP1) = 1, just notice that by axiom (i) of con-
ditional possibility P(ujv) = P(u ^ vjv).
P(Æjv) is a possibility measure, then eK(CP2) = 1, given that, for any v 2 SatðLÞ,
P(u _ wjv) = max{P(ujv),P(wjv)}.
We have that eK(CP3) = 1, since P(u ^ wjv) = min{P(ujv),P(wju ^ v)} corresponds
to axiom (iii) of conditional possibility.
eKðCP4Þ ¼ 1; given that Pð?jvÞ ¼ 0:
We now check that the inference rules do preserve validity in a model. As for the modal-
ization rule, suppose that K  u and K is safe for (ujv), then [u]W =W and [v]W5 ;,
hence e(P(ujv),w) = 1, that is K  ðujvÞ}.
As for substitution of equivalents, let K ¼ ðW ;U; e;PÞ be such that M  vM v 0 and K
is safe for (ujv) and ðujv0Þ}. Then, [v]W = [v 0]W5 ; and hence obviously eððujvÞ};wÞ ¼
eðPðujv0Þ;wÞ for any w 2W, that is, K  ðujvÞ}  ðujv0Þ}.
As for the monotonicity rule, suppose that K  u! w and that K is safe for both (ujv)
and (wjv). Clearly we have that eððujvÞ}Þ ¼ PðujvÞ 6 PðwjvÞ ¼ eððwjvÞ}Þ, hence K 
ðujvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ}. h
Proposition 4.7 (Soundness). The logic FCP is sound with respect to the class of condi-
tional possibility Kripke structures.
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Proof. Assume C ‘FCP U and recall Deﬁnition 4.2. If U is non-modal it is obvious, thus
assume U is modal. Now, let us suppose that C is modal as well. Then, by the above
lemma, we also have C FCP U. Finally, let C = D [ T where D is non-modal and T
modal. Let K ¼ ðW ;U; e;PÞ be such that K  D [ T and K is safe for U, we have to show
that K  U. Since K is safe for U, it means that [v]W5 ; for every v in elementary modal
formulas ðjvÞ} appearing in U. On the other hand, since K  D, then [w]W =W for every
w 2 Con(D). This means that K  D}, hence K  T [ D}. But now T [ D} is a modal
theory, hence K  U holds. h
Let D L be any given non-modal (propositional) theory (possibly empty). For any
u;w 2L, deﬁne u 
D w iﬀ uM w follows from D in classical propositional logic, i.e.
if uM w 2 Con(D). The relation 
D is an equivalence relation in L and [u]D will denote
the equivalence class of u. Obviously, the quotient set L=
D forms a Boolean algebra
which is isomorphic to a subalgebra B(XD) of the power set of the set XD of Boolean inter-
pretations of the crisp languageLwhich aremodel ofD.13 For eachu 2L, we shall identify
the equivalence class [u]D with the set {x 2 XDjx(u) = 1} 2 B(XD) of models of D that
make u true. We shall denote by CPðDÞ the set of conditional possibilities deﬁned over
L=
D  ðL=
D n ½?	Þ or, equivalently, on B(XD) · B(XD)0 (where B(XD)0 is B(XD)n{;}).
Notice that each conditional possibility P 2 CPðDÞ induces a conditional possibility
Kripke structure hXD,B(XD),eP,Pi where eP(p,x) = x(p) 2 {0,1} for each x 2 XD and
each propositional variable p. We shall denote byKD the class of possibilistic Kripke struc-
tures which are models of D, by CPðDÞ the class of conditional possibilities deﬁned on
B(XD) · B(XD)0, and by CPSðDÞ the class of possibilistic Kripke models fðXD;BðXDÞ;
eP;PÞjP 2 CPðDÞg. Obviously, CPSðDÞ KD.
Abusing the language, we will say that a conditional possibility P 2 CPðDÞ is a model
of a modal theory T whenever the induced Kripke structure hXD,B(XD),eP,Pi is a model
of T (obviously hXD,B(XD),eP,Pi is a model of D as well).
Given the above notions, we now prove the possibilistic completeness of FCP with
respect to ﬁnite theories (including modal and non-modal formulas), hence extending
the result given in [39] for modal theories.
Theorem 4.8 (Strong ﬁnite possibilistic completeness). Let T be a finite modal theory over
FCP, D a finite non-modal theory and U a modal formula with the following constraint: any
modal formula (ujv) appearing (as subformula) in T [ {U} is such that :v 62 ConðDÞ. Then
T [ D‘FCPU iff ePðUÞ ¼ 1
for each conditional possibility P 2 CPðDÞ model of T.
Proof. The proof follows the lines of that given in [29] for probabilities. However, so as to
make the paper self-contained, we lay it out.
First, we have to translate theories over FCP into theories over RPL. We deﬁne a
theory, called F, as follows:
13 Actually, BðXDÞ ¼ ffx 2 XDjxðuÞ ¼ 1gju 2Lg. Needless to say, if the language has only ﬁnitely many
propositional variables then the algebra B(XD) is just the whole power set of XD, otherwise it is a strict
subalgebra.
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(i) take as propositional variables of the theory variables of the form fujv, where u and v
are classical propositions from L, and v 2 SatðLÞ.
(ii) take as axioms of the theory the following ones, for each u, w and v:
ðF1Þ fujv, for u 2 Con(D), and v such that :v 62 ConðDÞ,
ðF2Þfujv  fujv0 , for any v, v 0 such that vM v 0 2 Con(D) and :v;:v0 62 ConðDÞ,
ðF3Þ fujv! fwjv, whenever u! w 2 Con(D), with :v 62 ConðDÞ,
ðF4Þ fujv! fu^vjv,
ðF5Þ fu_wjv  fujv _ fwjv,
ðF6Þ fu^wjv  fwju^v ^ fujv,
ðF7Þ:f?jv.
Then deﬁne the mapping * from modal formulas to RPL-formulas as follows:
• ððujvÞ}Þ ¼ fujv,
• r ¼ r,
• (U  W)* = U*  W*, for  2 {!,^,_}, and
• ð:ðujvÞ}Þ ¼ :fujv.
Let us denote by T* and ðD}Þ the sets of all formulas translated from T and D}.
Then, by the construction of F and ðD}Þ, one can easily check that for any U,
T [ D ‘FCP U iff T  [F [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL U: ð1Þ
Now we prove that the semantical analogue of (1) also holds, that is,
T [ D FCP U iff T  [F [ ðD}Þ RPL U: ð2Þ
Assume T  [F [ ðD}Þ 2RPL U. This means that there exists an RPL-evaluation e which
is model of T  [F [ ðD}Þ such that e(U*) < 1. We show that there is a Kripke model Ke of
T [ D, safe for U such that Ke 2 U. Deﬁne a conditional possibility Pe on B(XD) · B(XD)0
as follows:
Peð½u	Dj½v	DÞ ¼ eðfujvÞ;
with u; v 2L and :v 62 ConðDÞ. Moreover, let
e0ðp;wÞ ¼ wðpÞ
for each propositional variable p. We prove that Pe is a conditional possibility by showing
that, given e, the axioms of conditional possibility do hold.
(i) By F4, e(fujv! (fu^vjv)) = 1, i.e. e(fujv) 6 e(fu^vjv). Hence, Pe(ujv) 6 Pe(u ^ vjv).
Given that u ^ v! u is a Boolean tautology, by F3 we obtain the axiom fu^vjv!
fujv, and by an argument similar to the foregoing Pe(u ^ vjv) 6 Pe(ujv). Conse-
quently we have Pe(ujv) = Pe(u ^ vjv).
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(ii) We have to prove that Pe(Æjv) is a possibility measure:
• ByF1 we have that for any Boolean tautology >, e(f>jv) = 1. Then Pe(>jv) = 1.
• GivenF7, eð:f?jvÞ ¼ 1. But, eð:f?jvÞ ¼ 1 eðf?jvÞ ¼ 1Peð? jvÞ. Consequently,
Pe(?jv) = 0.
• By F3 if u! w is a classical tautology, then fujv! fwjv is an axiom. Therefore
Pe(ujv) 6 Pe(wjv).
• By F5 we have that Pe(u _ wjv) = max(Pe(ujv),Pe(wjv)).
• Given that u ^ w! w and u ^ w! u are Boolean tautologies, by F3 we have
that fu^wjv! fwjv and fu^wjv! fujv are theorems. Now, recall that ((U! W) ^
(U! C))! (U! (W ^ C)) is an RPL-theorem, then we easily obtain Pe(u ^
wjv) 6 min(Pe(ujv),Pe(wjv)).
(iii) Finally, given F6, we have that Pe(u ^ wjv) = min(Pe(wju ^ v),Pe(ujv)).
Therefore, we have proved that Pe actually is a conditional possibility. Then, it is clear
that the model Ke = hXD,B(XD) · B(XD)0,Pe,e 0i is a model of D. Indeed, for any w 2 XD,
e 0(u,w) = 1 for any u 2 D, and the truth degree of modal formulas W coincides with the
truth evaluation e(W*) since it only depends on the values of Pe and e over the elementary
modal formulas ðujvÞ} and atoms fujv respectively. Moreover, Ke clearly is a safe model.
Therefore e 0(W,w) = e(W*) for every modal formula W, and in particular e 0(U,w) =
e(U*) < 1.
Conversely, assume T [ D 2FCP U, that is, assume that there is a conditional possibility
Kripke structure K ¼ ðW ;U; e;PÞ which is a model of T [ D (hence safe for T), safe for U
but K 2 U. Thus, K is also a model of D} since for each ðujvÞ} 2 DP , [u]W =W and
[v]W5 ; and hence P([u]Wj[v]W) = 1. It is easy to see that there also exists an RPL-
evaluation eK model of T  [F [ ðD}Þ such that eK(W*) = e(W,w) for any modal formula
W and any w 2W. Indeed, take an arbitrary w 2W, and deﬁne:
eKðfujvÞ ¼ eððujvÞ
}Þ ¼ Pð½u	W j½v	W Þ; if ½v	W 6¼ ;;
arbitrary; otherwise:
(
Clearly, eK is a model of axiomsF1–F7 sinceP is a conditional possibility. For any mod-
al formula W 2 T [ D} we have eK(W*) = e(W,w) since this value is deﬁned (K is safe for
T [ {U}, hence also for D}), and moreover it only depends onP. Therefore eK(W*) = 1 for
every W 2 T  [F [ ðD}Þ but eK(U*) < 1, as desired. Hence we have proved the equiva-
lence (2).
From (1) and (2), to prove the theorem it remains to show that
T  [F [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL U iff T  [F [ ðD}Þ RPL U:
Recall that RPL is strongly complete but only for ﬁnite theories. Here the initial theories T
and D are ﬁnite, so are T* and ðD}Þ. However F contains inﬁnitely many instances of
axioms F1–F7. Nonetheless it is easy to prove that such inﬁnitely many instances can
be replaced by only ﬁnitely many instance, by using propositional normal forms, following
the lines of [[31], 8.4.12]. Indeed, take n propositional variables p1, . . . ,pn containing at
least all variables in T. For any formula u built from these propositional variables, take
the corresponding disjunctive normal form (u)dnf. Notice that there are only ﬁnitely many
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different such formulas. Then, when translating a modal formula U into U*, we replace
each atom fujv by fðuÞdnf jðvÞdnf to obtain its normal translation U

dnf . The theory T

dnf is the
(ﬁnite) set of all Wdnf , where W 2 T. The theoryFdnf is the finite set of instances of axioms
F1–F7 for disjunctive normal forms of Boolean formulas built from propositional vari-
ables p1, . . . ,pn. Following [31, 8.4.13], it is now easy to prove the following:
(a) T  [F [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL U iff T dnf [Fdnf [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL Udnf ,
(b) T  [F [ ðD}Þ RPL U iff T dnf [Fdnf [ ðD}Þ RPL Udnf .
Finally, we obtain the following chain of equivalences:
T [ D ‘FCP U iff T  [F [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL U
iff T dnf [Fdnf [ ðD}Þ ‘RPL Udnf
iff T dnf [Fdnf [ ðD}Þ RPL Udnf
iff T  [F [ ðD}Þ RPL U
iff T [ D FCP U:
Then the proof is complete. h
Notice that we have the following interesting types of deduction. If T is a ﬁnite (modal)
conditional theory over FCP, D is a propositional (non-modal) theory, and u and v are
non-modal formulas, then we have:
(i) T [ D ‘ r ! P ðujvÞ iﬀ P(ujv)P r, for each conditional possibility P 2 CPðDÞ
model of T;
(ii) T [ D ‘ P ðujvÞ ! r iﬀ P(ujv) 6 r, for each conditional possibility P 2 CPðDÞ
model of T.
5. Representing properties of conditional possibility and necessity
We can now show that, given the above results, the fundamental properties of condi-
tional possibility do hold in FCP.
Proposition 5.1. The following theorems and the inference rule (vi) are provable in FCP.
(i) ðujvÞ}  ðu ^ vjvÞ},
(ii) ð>jvÞ},
(iii) :ð? jvÞ},
(iv) ðvjvÞ},
(v) :ð:vjvÞ},
(vi) if ‘u! w then ðujvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ},
(vii) ðu _ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} _ ðwjvÞ},
(viii) ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðujvÞ} ^ ðwjvÞ},
(ix) ðu ^ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} ^ ðwju ^ vÞ}.
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Proof. Notice that (iii), (vi), (vii) and (ix) correspond to CP4, the monotonicity rule, CP2
and CP3, respectively.
(i) By CP1, ðujvÞ} ! ðu ^ vjvÞ}. Given that u ^ v! u is a Boolean tautology, by the
monotonicity rule we have ðu ^ vjvÞ} ! ðujvÞ}. Therefore, ðujvÞ}  ðu ^ vjvÞ}.
(ii) By the rule of modalization, ð>jvÞ} is a theorem.
(iv) By (i) and (ii) above we have ðvjvÞ}  ðv ^ >jvÞ}  ð>jvÞ}.
(v) By (i) and (iii) we have :ð:vjvÞ}  :ðv ^ :vjvÞ}  :ð? jvÞ}.
(viii) Recall that u ^ w! u and u ^ w! u are Boolean tautologies. Thus by the mono-
tonicity rule we have that ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðujvÞ} and ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ} are theo-
rems. Recall that ((U! W) ^ (W! C))! (U! (W ^ C)) is an RPL-theorem.
Therefore, it easily follows ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðujvÞ} ^ ðwjvÞ}. h
In FCP we can also represent measures of conditional necessity. Indeed, we have
deﬁned the unary operator (ÆjÆ)N, as follows:
ðujvÞN is :ð:ujvÞ}:
This allows to represent conditional necessity as a dual notion of conditional possibility.
Clearly the semantical interpretation for (ÆjÆ)N is given by conditional possibility Kripke
structures in which the evaluation e is obviously extended to modal formulas with N by
deﬁning:
eððujvÞN ;wÞ ¼ 1Pð½:u	j½v	Þ:
It is interesting to prove that the axioms of conditional necessity and its fundamental prop-
erties as deﬁned above can be actually derived in FCP. This means that just by making a
connective explicit from the ones deﬁned, we easily obtain a logic which can capture both
the notion of conditional possibility and the notion of conditional necessity.
Proposition 5.2. The following theorems and the inference rule (iv) are provable in FCP.
(i) (ujv)N  (u ^ vjv)N,
(ii) (>jv)N,
(iii) :ð? jvÞN ,
(iv) if ‘u! w then (ujv)N! (wjv)N,
(v) (u ^ wjv)N  (ujv)N ^ (wjv)N,
(vi) (ujv)N _ (wjv)N! (u _ wjv)N,
(vii) ðu _ wjvÞN  ðujvÞN _ ðwj:u ^ vÞN ,
(viii) (vjv)N,
(ix) :ð:vjvÞN .
Proof
(i) By deﬁnition ofNwe have that ðu ^ vjvÞN  :ð:ðu ^ vÞjvÞ}. By CP2,:ð:ðu ^ vÞjvÞ}
 :ðð:ujvÞ} _ ð:vjvÞ}Þ. Notice that by CP1, ð:vjvÞ}  ðv ^ :vjvÞ}  ð? jvÞ}.
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Therefore, :ð:ðu ^ vÞjvÞ}  :ð:u_ ? jvÞ. Now, it is easy to check that
(ujv)N  (u ^ vjv)N.
(ii) By CP4, :ð:>jvÞ} is a theorem. Then by deﬁnition of N, we directly obtain (>jv)N.
(iii) ð>jvÞ} is a theorem by modalization for . It is now easy to see that ð>jvÞ} 
::ð: ? jvÞ}  :ð? jvÞN .
(iv) If ‘u! w, then ‘ :w! :u. By the monotonicity rule ð:wjvÞ} ! ð:ujvÞ}, and by
properties of negation in RPL, :ð:ujvÞ} ! :ð:wjvÞ}. Hence, by deﬁnition of N,
(ujv)N! (wjv)N.
(v) By CP2, ð:u _ :wjvÞ}  ð:ujvÞ} _ ð:ujvÞ}. It is now easy to check that :ð:ðu^
wÞjvÞ}  :ð:ujvÞ} ^ :ð:wjvÞ}, which implies (u ^ wjv)N  (ujv)N ^ (wjv)N.
(vi) We have that ð:u ^ :wjvÞ} ! ð:ujvÞ} ^ ð:wjvÞ} is a theorem. Then it is easy to
prove that :ð:ujvÞ} _ :ð:wjvÞ} ! :ð:ðu _ wÞjvÞ}, which clearly implies (ujv)N _
(wjv)N! (u _ wjv)N.
(vii) By CP3 we have that ð:u ^ :wjvÞ}  ð:ujvÞ} ^ ð:wj:u ^ vÞ}. It easily follows that
:ð:ðu _ wÞjvÞ}  :ð:ujvÞ} _ :ð:wj:u ^ vÞ}, which yields ðu _ wjvÞN  ðujvÞN_
ðwj:u ^ vÞN .
(viii) By (i) and (ii) above we have (vjv)N  (v ^ >jv)N  (>jv)N.
(ix) By (i) and (iii) we have :ð:vjvÞN  :ðv ^ :vjvÞN  :ð? jvÞN . h
6. Consistency, coherence and compactness
In this section we lay out a link between consistency of FCP-modal theories and
the coherence of rational assessments of conditional possibility. In order to do so, we
need some previous notions and results concerning satisﬁability, compactness and
consistency.
A detailed investigation of compactness of many fuzzy logics was presented in [8]. The
notion of satisﬁability proposed there generalizes the classical one by admitting various
degrees of simultaneous satisﬁability.
Deﬁnition 6.1 [8]. For a set C of formulas in a fuzzy logic andK  [0,1], we say that C isK-
satisfiable if there exists an evaluation e such that e(u) 2 K for allu 2 C. The setC is said to be
finitely K-satisfiable if each ﬁnite subset ofC isK-satisﬁable. We say that a logic isK-compact
if K-satisﬁability is equivalent to ﬁnite K-satisﬁability. A logic satisﬁes the compactness
property if it is K-compact for each closed subset of [0, 1].
In particular we should mention that fuzzy logics only having continuous truth-func-
tions, like Łukasiewicz Logic, do enjoy the compactness property.
Theorem 6.2 ([4,8]). Let L be a given fuzzy logic whose connectives only have continuous
truth-functions. Then L has the compactness property.
Clearly, for any fuzzy logic L having a model is tantamount to {1}-satisﬁability. Now,
given Theorem 6.2 we can show that {1}-satisﬁability is equivalent to consistency for fuzzy
logics having a ﬁnitary notion of derivability (i.e. having inference rules which refer to only
ﬁnitely many premises).
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Theorem 6.3. Let L be a given fuzzy logic whose connectives only have continuous truth-
functions, and having a finitary notion of derivability. Then any countable L-theory C is
consistent iff it has a model.
Proof. Suppose that C has a model, then it is {1}-satisﬁable, and so is each ﬁnite subthe-
ory Ci  C, by Theorem 6.2. Hence every Ci is consistent, which implies that C 0 0.
Conversely, suppose that C is consistent. This yields that there is no Ci  C such that
Ci ‘ 0. Thus, all Ci are {1}-satisﬁable, and by Theorem 6.2 so is C. h
We can now examine the link between consistency and coherence.
In many real-life situations assessments of uncertainty are not precisely made over a set
of events with a speciﬁc algebraic structure. The approach to conditional measures devel-
oped in [9,1–3] allows partial assessments over an arbitrary family C of conditional events.
However, such assessments are required to be coherent, that is: they must satisfy the axi-
oms of a conditional measure whenever they are extended over the set EH0 of Boolean
supports of the conditional events in C.
Deﬁnition 6.4 [3]. Let C be an arbitrary ﬁnite family of conditional events, and P a real-
valued function deﬁned on C. We call P a coherent conditional possibility if for every
C0  C, where C0 ¼ EH, with E a Boolean algebra, H an additive set, H  E and
; 62H, there exists a conditional possibility deﬁned on C0 extending P.
We can easily show, similarly to the case of conditional probability in [40,29], that
checking coherence of a possibilistic assessment over an arbitrary family of conditional
events is tantamount to checking consistency of a suitably deﬁned theory in FCP. Indeed,
we need theories of the form C ¼ fðuijviÞ}  aig in order to have models in which possi-
bilistic assessments are not only 1-valued. But then, we cannot take into account real-val-
ued assessments, since we only have rational truth-constants in our language. Then we
obtain that for any rational assessment its coherence is equivalent to the consistency of
the respective theory in FCP, given that its extension induces a possibilistic Kripke struc-
ture which is a model of such a theory.
Theorem 6.5. Let j = {P(uijvi) = ai} be a rational possibilistic assessment. Then j is
coherent iff the theory Cj ¼ fðuijviÞ}  aig is consistent in FCP, i.e. Cj 0FCP 0.
Proof. Suppose that Cj is consistent. As shown in the completeness proof (equivalence
(1)), also the translated RPL-theory Cj is consistent. RPL has connectives with continuous
truth-functions and a ﬁnitary notion of derivability. Then, by Theorem 6.3, the theory Cj
has a model e. From the completeness proof we know that e induces a possibilistic Kripke
structure which is a model Ke of Cj. Ke is equipped with a conditional possibility measure
hence, the assessment j = {P(uijvi) = ai} is coherent.
The converse is similar and so left to the reader. h
Given the above theorems, it is now easy to prove a compactness result for coherent
possibilistic assessments. This means that when we have a rational possibilistic assessment
to an arbitrary family of conditional events, such an assessment is coherent if and only
if its restriction to each ﬁnite subset of that family also is coherent. Indeed, since any of
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such coherent restrictions can be translated into a theory which is consistent by
Theorem 6.5, the whole corresponding theory is consistent, and consequently, again by
Theorem 6.5, the corresponding assessment is coherent. Notice that this result concerns
rational assessments of conditional possibility only, and it is proved by purely logical
means.
Theorem 6.6. Let j = {P(uijvi) = ai} be a rational possibilistic assessment over a family of
conditional events C. Let j#I be the restriction of j to each finite I, such that I  C. Then:
j is coherent iff j#I is coherent for every I:
Proof. Obviously, if j is coherent, then for any ﬁnite subset I  C also j#I is coherent.
Conversely, suppose that j#I is coherent for every I. Hence, by Theorem 6.5, each theory
Cj#I ¼ fðuijviÞ
}  aig is consistent in FCP. Therefore, Cj ¼ fðuijviÞ}  aig is consistent
in FCP, so by Theorem 6.5 j is coherent. h
7. Generalized conditional possibility and necessity
In [2], the authors introduced generalized conditional possibilities14 by generalizing the
deﬁnition of conditional possibility. Indeed, while the third characteristic axiom of condi-
tional possibility is based on the minimum t-norm, in the case of generalized conditional
possibility we can use any t-norm.
Following the above strategy, the aim of this section consists in building up a logic for
reasoning about generalized conditional possibility and necessity.
Deﬁnition 7.1 [2]. A real function P deﬁned on C ¼ EH, where E is a Boolean
algebra,H0 an additive set, withH0  E andH0 ¼H n f;g, is a generalized conditional
possibility if the following conditions hold:
(i) P(ujv) = P(u ^ vjv), for every u 2 E and v 2H.
(ii) P(Æjv) is a possibility measure, for any given v 2H.
(iii) Pðu ^ wjvÞ ¼TðPðujvÞ;Pðwju ^ vÞÞ, for every w 2 E and u; v 2H, u ^ v5; for a
t-norm T.
No concept of conditional necessity is derived from that of generalized conditional pos-
sibility. However, it can be easily introduced by taking into account De Morgan triples.
Recall that a triple hT;S; ni is called a De Morgan triple if and only if n is a strong nega-
tion, T a t-norm, and S is the t-conorm n-dual of T so that
Sðx; yÞ ¼ nðTðnðxÞ; nðyÞÞÞ:
Then we deﬁne the concept of generalized conditional necessity.
14 Notice the those measures are sometimes called -conditional possibility orT-conditional possibility, where
 clearly represents a t-norm.
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Deﬁnition 7.2. Let P be a generalized conditional possibility and let hT;S; ni be a De
Morgan triple. The conditional dual function N of P is deﬁned as
NðujvÞ ¼ nðPð:ujvÞÞ
for every v 2H.
Given a De Morgan triple hT;S; ni and a generalized conditional possibility P we can
obtain what follows:
• Wehave thatNðu ^ vjvÞ ¼ nðPð:u _ :vjvÞÞ for anyu 2 E, and v 2H. Therefore,Nðu^
vjvÞ ¼ nðmaxðPð:ujvÞ;Pð:vjvÞÞÞ ¼ nðmaxðPð:ujvÞ; 0ÞÞ ¼ nðPð:ujvÞÞ ¼ NðujvÞ.
• From condition (ii) above, P(Æjv) is a possibility measure for any v 2H. Then, given
that P(;jv) and P(vjv) = 1 we easily obtain N(;jv) and N(vjv) = 1. We have
Pðw _ ujvÞ ¼ maxðnðNð:wjvÞÞ; nðNð:ujvÞÞÞ for any w; u 2 E, and nðNð:ðw_
uÞjvÞÞ ¼ maxðnðNð:wjvÞÞ; nðNð:ujvÞÞÞ. Then we have that Nð:w ^ :ujvÞ ¼ min
ðNð:wjvÞ; Nð:ujvÞÞ, for any given w; u 2 E, and v 2 H. Thus N(Æjv) is a necessity
measure.
• By condition (iii) Pð:u ^ :wjvÞ ¼TðPð:ujvÞ;Pð:wj:u ^ vÞÞ, for every w 2 E and
u; v 2H, :u ^ v 6¼ ; for a t-norm T. Then, Pð:u ^ :wjvÞ ¼ Pð:ðu _ wÞjvÞ ¼
nðNðu _ wjvÞÞ. MoreoverTðPð:ujvÞ;Pð:wj:u^vÞÞ ¼TðnðNðujvÞÞ;nðNðwj:u^vÞÞÞ.
Therefore nðNðu _ wjvÞÞ ¼TðnðNðujvÞÞ; nðNðwj:u ^ vÞÞÞ, and so Nðu _ wjvÞ ¼
SðNðujvÞ; Nðwj:u ^ vÞÞ.
Then we obtain the following deﬁnition for generalized conditional necessity.
Deﬁnition 7.3. A real function N deﬁned on C ¼ EH, where E is a Boolean algebra,
H0 an additive set, withH0  E andH0 ¼H n f;g, is a generalized conditional necessity
if the following conditions hold:
(i) N(ujv) = N(u ^ vjv), for every u 2 E and v 2H.
(ii) N(Æjv) is a necessity measure, for any given v 2H.
(iii) Nðu _ wjvÞ ¼SðNðujvÞ;Nðwj:u ^ vÞÞ, for every w;u 2 E and :u; v 2H, :u ^ v 6¼
; for a t-conorm S n-dual of T.
Now, we want to study a logic for reasoning about generalized conditional possibilities
and necessities. We need a system which could carry out the presence of t-norms, yielding
by means of an involutive negation (not dependent on the t-norm) the dual t-conorms.
Here, we can deal with diﬀerent choices. The one proposed in [39] consists in relying on
ŁP 1
2
. As shown in [7,41], any continuous t-norm ﬁnitely constructed by means of the ordi-
nal sum technique15 can be represented in ŁP 1
2
by introducing new connectives which eﬀec-
tively reproduce such a ﬁnite construction16. We can then deﬁne two operations17
15 Consult [38] for the ordinal sum construction of t-norms.
16 In particular, we have that a continuous t-norm is deﬁnable in the ŁP 12-algebra over the real unit interval if
and only if it is representable as a ﬁnite ordinal sum [7,41].
17 See [7] for details.
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 u&Rw 
m^
i¼1
ðu&ri;siAi wÞ  u!Rw 
_m
i¼1
ðu!ri ;siAi wÞ;
where A is either P or Ł; u, w, v, c are formulas; m is a natural number and R a sequence
of pairs ([ri,si],Ai), where [ri, si] is a closed interval from [0,1], r; s 2 ½0; 1	 \Q, si 6 ri+1, and
Pr;s;&r;sA and !r;sA are deﬁned as follows:
• Pr;sðu;w;v;cÞ  ½v^Dððr!pu^wÞ^ ðu_w!psÞÞ	 _ ½c^:pDððr!pu^wÞ^ ðu_w!psÞÞ	;
• u&r;sA w  Pr;sð½ððs rÞ!pðu rÞÞ&Aððs rÞ!pðw rÞÞ	&pðs rÞ  r;u ^ w;u;wÞ;
• u!r;sA w  Pr;sð½ððs rÞ!pðu rÞÞ!Aððs rÞ!p ðw rÞÞ	&pðs rÞ  r;w;u;wÞ _ Dðu!pwÞ.
The truth-functions obtained for &R and !R actually are ﬁnitely constructed continu-
ous t-norms and their residua, respectively.
As shown in [41], ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norms are not the only t-norms
deﬁnable in ŁP 1
2
. Indeed, we can deﬁne several left-continuous and discontinuous t-
norms. However, so far, there is no explicit way to characterize the whole class of t-norms
deﬁnable in ŁP 1
2
. In this work, we then prefer to rely only on continuous t-norms, also
because continuity of the connectives will allow the possibility of proving compactness
results. Hence, even if we take into account only a restricted class of t-norms, we can safely
rely on LP 1
2
, since we can also exploit Łukasiewicz standard negation ns(x) = 1  x so as
to obtain the ns-dual t-conorms. Then, we introduce the logic FCPðTRÞ whose language is
deﬁned similarly to that of FCP.
Deﬁnition 7.4. The axioms of the logic FCPðTRÞ are the following:
(i) The set TautðLÞ of classical Boolean tautologies
(ii) Axioms of ŁP 1
2
for modal formulas
(iii) Possibilistic modal axioms:
(RCP1) ðujvÞ}!lðu ^ vjvÞ}
(RCP2) ðu _ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} _ ðwjvÞ}
(RCP3) ðu ^ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ}&Rðwju ^ vÞ}
(RCP4) :ð? jvÞ}.
Deduction rules of FCPðTRÞ are those of ŁP 12 (i.e.modus ponens and necessitation forD),
plus:
(iv) modalization: from u derive ðujvÞ}
(v) substitution of equivalents for the conditioning event: from vM v 0, derive ðujvÞ} 
ðujv0Þ}
(vi) monotonicity: from u! w derive ðujvÞ}!lðwjvÞ}.
Clearly ðujvÞN  :ð:ujvÞ}.
The semantics for FCPðTRÞ is given by TR-conditional possibility Kripke structures
K ¼ hW ;U; e;Pi, where W, U and e are deﬁned as above for FCP, and P is a generalized
conditional possibility restricted to a speciﬁc ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norms so
that:
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eðU&RWÞ ¼TRðeðUÞ; eðWÞÞ;
where, TR is a ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norm. Clearly e is extended w.r.t. the
other ŁP 1
2
-connectives as usual. Notice that by deﬁning
URW  :ð:U&R:WÞ;
then eðURWÞ ¼SRðeðUÞ; eðWÞÞ, whereSR is the continuous t-conorm ns-dual ofTR ob-
tained by means of the standard involutive negation ns(x) = 1  x. Then, it is easy to prove
the following results.18
Proposition 7.5 (Soundness). The logic FCPðTRÞ is sound with respect to the class ofTR-
conditional possibility Kripke structures.
Theorem 7.6 (Strong ﬁnite possibilistic completeness). Let T be a finite modal theory over
FCPðTRÞ, D a finite non-modal theory and U a modal formula with the following constraint:
any modal formula (ujv) appearing (as subformula) in T [ {U} is such that :v 62 ConðDÞ.
Then
T [ D ‘FCPðTRÞ U iff ePðUÞ ¼ 1
for each TR-conditional possibility model P of T belonging to the class of TR-conditional
possibility Kripke models of D.
The above treatment can be generalized by relying on the logic MTL
. Indeed, as men-
tioned above MTL
 is the logic of left-continuous t-norms and their dual t-conorms.
Moreover, any involutive negation can be represented in such a logic. Therefore MTL

provides the most general framework for our purposes. Still, this will oﬀer a purely qual-
itative representation, since we cannot deal with truth constants and we will work with
class of operators rather than speciﬁc ones. We deﬁne, then, the logic QFCP—Qualitative
Fuzzy Conditional Possibility—whose language, again, is deﬁned as an obvious modiﬁca-
tion of that of FCP.
Deﬁnition 7.7. The axioms of the logic QFCP are the following:
(i) The set TautðLÞ of classical Boolean tautologies
(ii) Axioms of MTL
 for modal formulas
(iii) Possibilistic modal axioms:
(QCP1) ðujvÞ} ! ðu ^ vjvÞ},
(QCP2) ðu _ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ} _ ðwjvÞ},
(QCP3) ðu ^ wjvÞ}  ðujvÞ}&ðwju ^ vÞ},
(QCP4) 
 ð? jvÞ}.
18 Notice that the deﬁnitions of proof, safe model, and both syntactic and semantic consequence are given by an
easy adaptation of those provided for FCP. We also omit the proofs since the techniques to prove completeness
and soundness correspond to those given for FCP with the obvious modiﬁcations.
E. Marchioni / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 43 (2006) 133–165 157
Deduction rules of QFCP are those of MTL
 (i.e. modus ponens and necessitation
for D), plus:
(iv) modalization: from u derive ðujvÞ}
(v) substitution of equivalents for the conditioning event: from vM v 0, derive ðujvÞ} 
ðujv0Þ}
(vi) monotonicity: from u! w derive ðujvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ}.
Clearly ðujvÞN 
 ð:ujvÞ}.
We now deﬁne the semantics for QFCP by introducing Tlc-conditional possibility
Kripke structures.
Deﬁnition 7.8. A Tlc-conditional possibility Kripke model is a structure K ¼ hW ;
U; e;Pi, where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds.
• U is a Boolean algebra of subsets of W.
• e:V ·W! {0,1} is a Boolean evaluation of the propositional variables, that is,
e(p,w) 2 {0,1} for each propositional variable p 2 V and each world w 2W. Any given
truth-evaluation e(Æ,w) is extended to Boolean propositions as usual. For a Boolean for-
mula u, we will denote by [u]W the set of worlds in which u is true, i.e. [u]W = {w 2
Wje(u,w) = 1}.
• P : UU0 ! ½0; 1	 is a generalized conditional possibility (restricted to left-continuous
t-norms) over UU0, where U0 ¼ U n f;g, and such that ([u]W, [v]W) is P-measurable
for any non-modal u and v (with [v]W5;).
• e(Æ,w) is extended to elementary modal formulas by deﬁning
eððujvÞ};wÞ ¼ Pð½u	W j½v	W Þ
and to arbitrary modal formulas according to MTL
-semantics (where n is an arbitrary
involutive negation, T is a left continuous t-norm and I its residual implication) that is
eððujvÞN ;wÞ ¼ nðPð½:u	W j½v	W ÞÞ;
eðU ^W;wÞ ¼ minððU;wÞ; eðW;wÞÞ;
eðU&W;wÞ ¼TððU;wÞ; eðW;wÞÞ;
eðU! W;wÞ ¼ IððU;wÞ; eðW;wÞÞ:
Notice that by deﬁning
U_W 
 ð
 U& 
 WÞ;
then eðU_WÞ ¼SðeðUÞ; eðWÞÞ, where S is the t-conorm n-dual of T obtained by means
of the strong negation n so that Sðx; yÞ ¼ nðTðnðxÞ; nðyÞÞÞ.
Again, it is now easy to obtain the following results.
Proposition 7.9 (Soundness). The logic QFCP is sound with respect to the class of Tlc-
conditional possibility Kripke structures.
Theorem 7.10 (Strong ﬁnite possibilistic completeness). Let T be a finite modal theory
over QFCP, D a finite non-modal theory and U a modal formula with the following
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constraint: any modal formula (ujv) appearing (as subformula) in T [ {U} is such that :v 62
ConðDÞ. Then
T‘QFCPU iff ePðUÞ ¼ 1
for each left-continuous t-norm Tlc and for each Tlc-conditional possibility model P of T
belonging to the class of Tlc-conditional possibility Kripke models of D.
Choosing to rely either on ŁP 1
2
or on MTL
 depends on the properties we want our
logic to have. As noticed above, it is clear that MTL
 allows to prove results w.r.t. the
most general class of t-norms, t-conorms and strong negations, while in ŁP 1
2
we can just
specify each time a ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norms and its dual t-conorms along
with the standard involutive negation. However, MTL
 provides a more qualitative
framework since we cannot handle rational truth constants. This means that the above
results on coherence cannot be extended to QFCP, while for FCPðTRÞ we obtain the fol-
lowing result whose proof is similar to that provided above.
Theorem 7.11. Let j = {P(uijvi) = ai} be a rational generalized possibilistic assessment
restricted to a specified finitely constructed continuous t-norm. Then j is coherent iff the
theory Cj ¼ fðuijviÞ}  aig is consistent in FCPðTRÞ, i.e. Cj 0FCPðTRÞ 0.
Notice that the proof of the above theorem relies on the following corollary which is a
consequence of Theorem 6.3.
Corollary 7.12. Let L be a given fuzzy logic having a finitary notion of derivability. Then
any countable L-theory C involving only connectives whose truth-functions are continuous is
consistent iff it has a model.
Given that there is no compactness result concerning MTL
, nothing can be said about
QFCP-compactness, while we can easily prove the following theorem for FCPðTRÞ.
Theorem 7.13. Let j = {P(uijvi) = ai} be a rational generalized possibilistic assessment
(restricted to a specified finitely constructed continuous t-norm) over a family of conditional
events C. Let j#I be the restriction of j to each finite I, such that I  C. Then:
j is coherent iff j#I is coherent for every I:
Thus, if we aim at representing basic and general qualitative properties, QFCP clearly
constitutes the best choice. If we need to frame quantitative assessments and represent
coherence w.r.t. a chosen ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norm, FCPðTRÞ does work
better.
8. Comparative conditional possibilities
In [12], Coletti and Vantaggi studied binary relations deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of condi-
tional events, so as to detect the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for representing such
qualitative relations by a coherent conditional possibility. In this section we show how
properties of those binary relations can be represented in the logics studied above.
Let E be a set of conditional events and  a binary relation over E. A function f : E!
Rþ represents  if:
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ujv  wjc iff f ðujvÞ 6 f ðwjcÞ:
ujv 
 wjc means that both ujv  wjc and wjc  ujv holds.
In [11] the authors introduced for a relation  over BH the following axioms which
are necessary and suﬃcient for the representation of  by a generalized decomposable
conditional measure [9].
(A0) the relation  is a total preorder (i.e. it is reﬂexive, transitive and deﬁned for every
pair ujv,wjc);
(A1) for every v 2H it holds
;jv  vjv;
(A2) for all v; c 2H,
;jv 
 ;jc and vjv 
 cjc;
(M) for all u;w 2 B and v 2H,
if u ^ v! w ^ v then ujv  wjv;
(A3) for all ui;wi 2 B and wi ^ vi; vi 2H ði ¼ 1; 2Þ, u1jw1 ^ v1  u2jw2 ^ v2 and w1jv1 
w2jv2 implies u1 ^ w1jv1  u2 ^ w2jv2, and u1jw1 ^ v1  w2jv2 and w1jv1  u2jw2 ^ v2
implies u1 ^ w1jv1  u2 ^ w2jv2.
If the condition (M) is replaced by
(CP0) for all u;w; c 2 B and v 2H
ujv  wjv implies u _ cjv  w _ cjv;
we obtain that the relation v, deﬁned as
uvw iff ujv  wjv;
can be represented by a possibility P(Æjv).
In [12], the authors prove the following proposition concerning generalized conditional
possibilities.
Proposition 8.1 [12]. LetP be a coherent generalized conditional possibility on a finite set of
conditional events E. If  is a binary relation on E induced by P, then  admits an extension
onBH  E (withH a Boolean algebra andH an additive set) satisfying (A0), (A1), (A2),
(A3), and (CPO).
We show now how both in FCPðTRÞ and in QFCP we can deﬁne a comparative bin-
ary relation by means of the implication connective.
Theorem 8.2. For a theory C and any pair of conditional events, define inQFCP (FCPðTRÞ)
uijvi C wijci iff C ‘QFCP ðuijviÞ} ! ðwijciÞ}:
ðuijvi C wijci iff C ‘FCPðTRÞ ðuijviÞ} ! ðwijciÞ}Þ:
Then, C satisfies (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3), and (CPO).
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Proof. Clearly the proof consists in deducing syntactically the above conditions (we just
treat the case of QFCP). Notice that if the theory C is of the form T [ D, we assume that
for any conditioning event v, :v 62 ConðDÞ.
• Notice that for any pair of modal formulas U,W we have that either U! W, or W! U.
We also have that U! U, and also transitivity holds. Then, (A0) clearly holds since C
is a total preorder.
• Notice that ?! u is a Boolean theorem for any u. Then by monotonicity we get
ð? juÞ} ! ðujuÞ}, hence (A1) holds.
• 
ð? jvÞ} and 
ð? jcÞ} are instances of the same axiom. Then 
 ð?jvÞ} 
 ð?jcÞ} and
ð? jvÞ}  ð? jcÞ}. Moreover, obviously ðujuÞ}  ðwjwÞ}. Then (A2) holds.
• Suppose that ðu1jw1 ^ v1Þ} ! ðu2jw2 ^ v2Þ} and ðw1jv1Þ} ! ðw2jv2Þ} hold. Notice that
((U1! W1)&(U2! W2))! ((U1&U2)! (W1&W2)) is a theorem, then so is ððu1jw1^
v1Þ}&ðw1jv1Þ}Þ ! ððu2jw2 ^ v2Þ}&ðw2jv2Þ}Þ. Now, by QCP4 we obtain ðu1 ^ w1jv1Þ}
! ðu2 ^ w2jv2Þ}.
Now suppose that ðu1jw1 ^ v1Þ} ! ðw2jv2Þ} and ðw1jv1Þ} ! ðu2jw2 ^ v2Þ} hold. Rea-
soning exactly as above we obtain ðu1 ^ w1jv1Þ} ! ðu2^ w2jv2Þ}. Therefore, (A3)
holds.
• Suppose that ðujvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ} holds, then ðujvÞ} _ ðcjvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ} _ ðcjvÞ} is a theorem.
Now, by QCP2 we immediately have ðu _ cjvÞ} ! ðw _ cjvÞ}. Then (CPO) holds. h
The above results show that the axioms provided are necessary for representing a rela-
tion  by a generalized conditional possibility. Clearly, whenever a particular t-norm is
speciﬁed, other axioms must be added. In [12] the authors provide the following deﬁnitions
and results for those cases in which the chosen operator is the minimum t-norm (hence we
are dealing with a conditional possibility).
Deﬁnition 8.3 [12]. Let E ¼ BH a ﬁnite set of conditional events with H a Boolean
algebra andH an additive set such thatH  B and ; 62H. A binary relation  on E is
said comparative conditional possibility iﬀ the following conditions hold:
(1)  is a total preorder;
(2) for any v; c 2H,
;jv 
 ;jc  vjv 
 c j c;
(3) for any u;w 2 B and v;w ^ v 2H,
u ^ wjv  ujw ^ v;
and moreover, if u ^ wjv  wjv or wjv 
 vjv, then
u ^ wjv 
 ujw ^ v;
(4)  satisﬁes (CPO).
Proposition 8.4 [12]. Let  a relation on E ¼ BH satisfying (CPO) and condition (3) in
the above definition. Then  also satisfies (A3).
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Theorem 8.5. For a theory C and any pair of conditional events, define in FCP
uijvi C wijci iff C ‘FCP ðuijviÞ} ! ðwijciÞ}:
Then, C is a comparative conditional possibility.
Proof. We just have to prove that condition (3) holds, since all the other properties are
shown in Theorem 8.2. First, notice that ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ} ^ ðujw ^ vÞ} holds by
CP3. Moreover, ðwjvÞ} ^ ðujw ^ vÞ} ! ðujw ^ vÞ}, therefore, ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðujw ^ vÞ}.
Now, ðu ^ wjvÞ} ! ðwjvÞ} obviously always holds. Then ðu ^ wjvÞ} ^ ðwjvÞ}  ðu ^ w
jvÞ}. By CP4, ðu ^ wjvÞ}  ðwjvÞ} ^ ðujw ^ vÞ}  ðu ^ wjvÞ} ^ ðwjvÞ}. Hence it is easy to
see that ðujw ^ vÞ}  ðu ^ wjvÞ}. The same holds if ðwjvÞ}  ðvjvÞ}. Thus condition (3)
holds. h
Deﬁnition 8.6 [12]. Let  be a binary relation on a set of conditional events C. Then,  is
a coherent comparative conditional possibility if and only if there exists a comparative
conditional possibility on BH  E which extends .
Theorem 8.7 [12]. Let C be a finite set of conditional events. For a binary relation  on C,
the following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is a coherent comparative conditional possibility;
(ii) there exists a coherent conditional possibility P on C representing .
We enhance now the last theorem and show that coherent comparative conditional
possibility can be framed in FCP. Again, we exploit properties of implication. Given
Theorem 8.5 the proof is easy.
Theorem 8.8. Let C be a finite set of conditional events. For a binary relation  on C, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is a coherent comparative conditional possibility;
(ii) there exists a rational coherent conditional possibility P on C representing ;
(iii) there is a theory C in FCP such that C represents .
9. Final remarks
In this paper we have studied the logics FCP, FCPðTRÞ and QFCP to reason about
conditional possibility and generalized conditional possibility, and we have shown that
such logics are strongly complete for ﬁnite theories. In particular, we have introduced
the notion of generalized conditional necessity as a dual notion w.r.t. generalized condi-
tional possibility.
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We have deﬁned a framework in which we can also represent the notion of coherence as
strongly related to consistency of suitably deﬁned theories. Compactness for coherent
assessments of both conditional and generalized conditional possibility (restricted to
ﬁnitely constructed continuous t-norms) has been proved by logical techniques. Finally
we have studied the representation of qualitative ordinal relations among conditional
events as properties of the above logical systems.
We deem that this approach is important since it clearly shows the usefulness of fuzzy
logics for the representation of uncertainty. An obvious advantage, w.r.t. other formal
frameworks, consists in the fact that in fuzzy logics the operations associated to the eval-
uation of the connectives are functions deﬁned over the real unit interval [0,1], which cor-
respond, directly or up to some combinations, to operations used to compute degrees of
uncertainty. Then such algebraic operations can be embedded in the connectives of the
many-valued logical framework, resulting in clear and elegant formalizations. Given that
there is not one fuzzy logic but a family of fuzzy logics, the choice of the logic to exploit to
represent a speciﬁc measure of uncertainty will clearly depend on the operations we need
to represent. This also implies that some properties of the chosen logic might be inherited
by the measure we deﬁne in it. Indeed, once proved the connection between the consistency
of a suitably deﬁned theory in our logic and the coherence of the related assessment, prop-
erties like compactness or computational complexity (see [24], for instance) for those
assessments can be easily studied by purely logical means. The case studied in this paper
is an overt example of the advantages fuzzy logics can provide. Indeed, we wish to stress
again that the compactness results we have shown have been obtained by exploiting logical
properties determined by an adequate representation of conditional possibilities.
Further research will deal with the investigation of computational complexity of the
coherence test of conditional possibility deﬁned with Go¨del t-norm and product t-norm.
In [3,23,10], the authors show that the coherence of an assessment of generalized condi-
tional possibility to a class of conditional events is tantamount to the existence of a family
of simple possibility measures deﬁned over sets of the atoms generated by the conditional
events. This holds, with signiﬁcant technical diﬀerences, both for conditional possibilities
deﬁned with the minimum t-norm and for conditional possibilities deﬁned with the prod-
uct t-norm.19 Such an equivalence also provides, by means of sequences of systems of
equalities and inequalities, an algorithm for checking coherence by relying on simple pos-
sibility measures. This suggests that, following [24], we can frame coherence tests in a log-
ical setting. Indeed, by deﬁning a logic for simple possibility measures, we can build up
fuzzy modal theories and show that their consistency is tantamount to the coherence of
an assessment of conditional possibility. Following [33] we can also show that the satisﬁ-
ability problem for the logic deﬁned is NP-complete, obtaining then that the coherence test
also is NP-complete. This will be the topic of a forthcoming paper.
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